

# Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yV F

## Security Target

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### Document information

Info	Content
<b>Keywords</b>	Security Target, Crypto Library, P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF
<b>Abstract</b>	Security Target for the Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF according to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Evaluation (CC) at Level EAL5 augmented. The Crypto Library is developed and provided by NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification.



**Revision history**

Rev	Date	Description
1.0	2013-01-15	Initial version of document, derived from ST for Crypto Library on P60D024P v1.0
1.1	2013-03-14	Revision according to evaluator comments
1.2	2013-03-14	TOE CC number added
1.3	2013-08-28	2-key Triple-DES declared as unsecure
1.4	2015-01-05	Updated according to latest HW ST changes
1.5	2015-03-09	INTEGRITY_CHK removed, UGM reference updated
1.6	2016-09-12	Update of reference to Crypto Library UGM version in Table 1
1.7	2016-09-27	Removed P60D024/016/012DVB(Y/Z/A) major configuration in Section 1.1

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## Glossary

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CBC	Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC	Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
CC	Common Criteria Version 3.1
CPU	Central Processing Unit
DEA	Data Encryption Algorithm
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DRNG	Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB	Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
IC	Integrated circuit
IT	Information Technology
MMU	Memory Management Unit
MX	Memory eXtension
n/a	not applicable
NDA	Non Disclosure Agreement
PKC	Public Key Cryptography
PP	Protection Profile
PSW(H)	Program Status Word (High byte)
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	as abbreviation of the CC term: Security Functional Requirement, as abbreviation of the technical term of the SmartMX-family: Special Function Register
SIM	Subscriber Identity Module
ST	Security Target.
TOE	Target of Evaluation.
TRNG	True Random Number Generator
TSF	Part of the TOE that realises the security functionality
TSFI	TSF Interface, a means by which external entities (or subjects in the TOE but outside of the TSF) supply data to the TSF, receive data from the TSF and invoke services from the TSF
UART	Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter

## 1. ST Introduction

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This chapter is divided into the following sections: “ST Identification”, “TOE overview”, and “TOE Description”.

### 1.1 ST Identification

This Security Target is for the Common Criteria evaluation of the “Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF” provided by NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification.

ST Identification: Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF, Rev. 1.7 - 27 September 2016  
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The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of:

- The hardware “NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF”, which is used as evaluated platform, and all its Major Configurations (see [11] for details):
  - P60D024MVB(Y/Z/A)/MVF
  - P60D016MVB(Y/Z/A)/MVF
  - P60D012MVB(Y/Z/A)/MVF
  - P60D024DVF
  - P60D016DVF
  - P60D012DVF
- The “Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF”, which is built upon this platform.

This Security Target builds on the Hardware Security Target [11], which refers to the “NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF” provided by NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification.

Additional major configurations P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF are also supported but not part of the TOE described in this security target (see [11] for details).

To unify documents derivative independent identification “Crypto Library on SmartMX2” is used where possible. Derivative dependent information is emphasized as such.

### 1.2 TOE overview

#### 1.2.1 Introduction

The Hardware Security Target [11] contains, in section 1.3 “ST Overview”, an introduction about the SmartMX2 hardware TOE that is considered in the evaluation. The Hardware Security Target includes IC Dedicated Software stored in the ROM provided with the SmartMX2 hardware platform.

The “Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF” is a cryptographic library, which provides a set of cryptographic functions that can be used by the Smartcard embedded Software. The cryptographic library consists of several binary packages that are intended to be linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software developer links the binary packages that he needs to his

Smartcard Embedded Software and the whole is subsequently implemented in arbitrary memory of the hardware platform.

The NXP SmartMX2 smart card processor P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF provides the computing platform and cryptographic support by means of co-processors for the Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF.

The Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF provides the security functionality described below in addition to the functionality described in the Hardware Security Target [11] for the hardware platform:

The Crypto Library provides AES<sup>1</sup>, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key generation, RSA public key computation, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) signature generation and verification, ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) key generation, ECDH (ECC Diffie-Hellmann) key-exchange, full point addition (ECC over GF(p)), SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms.<sup>2</sup>

Most algorithms are resistant against attacks as described in the JIL attack methods for smartcard and similar devices [37].

In addition, the Crypto Library implements a software (pseudo) random number generator which is initialized (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX2.

Finally, the TOE provides a secure copy routine, a secure memory compare routine and includes internal security measures for residual information protection.

### 1.2.2 Life-Cycle

The life cycle of the hardware platform as part of the TOE is described in section “TOE Intended Usage” of the Hardware Security Target [11]. The delivery process or the hardware platform is independent from the Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF.

The Crypto Library is delivered in Phase 1 (for a definition of the Phases refer to section ‘1.2.3 TOE life cycle’ of the Protection Profile [10]) as a software package (a set of binary files) to the developers of Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software may comprise in this case an operating system and/or other smart card software (applications). The Software developer can incorporate the Crypto Library into their product.

The subsequent use of the Crypto Library by Smartcard Embedded Software Developers is out of the control of the developer NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification; the integration of the Crypto Library into Smartcard Embedded Software is not part of this evaluation.

#### Security during Development and Production

The development process of the Crypto Library is part of the evaluation. The access to the implementation documentation, test bench and the source code is restricted to the development team of the Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF. The security measures installed within NXP, including a secure delivery process, ensure the integrity and quality of the delivered Crypto Library binary files.

1. AES, DES and Triple-DES can be used in ECB, CBC, CBC-MAC, or CMAC mode.
2. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate security level must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards). In particular this means that SHA-1, Single-DES, 2-key Triple-DES, and short key lengths for RSA and ECC shall not be used.

### 1.2.3 Specific Issues of Smartcard Hardware and the Common Criteria

Regarding the Application Note 2 of the Protection Profile [10] the TOE provides additional functionality which is not covered in the Protection profile [10] and the Hardware Security Target [11]. This additional functionality is added using the policy “P.Add-Func” (see section 3.3 of this Security Target).

## 1.3 TOE Description

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) consists of a hardware part and a software part:

- The hardware part consists of the NXP P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF Secure Smart Card Controller with IC Dedicated Software stored in the Test-ROM that is not accessible in the System Mode or the User Mode after Phase 3. The hardware part of the TOE includes dedicated guidance documentation.
- The software part consists of the IC Dedicated Support Software “Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF” which consists of a software library and associated documentation. The Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF is an additional part that provides cryptographic functions that can be operated on the hardware platform as described in this Security Target.

The hardware part of the TOE is not described in detail in this document. Details are included in the Hardware Security Target [11] and therefore this latter document will be cited wherever appropriate. However the assets, assumptions, threats, objectives and security functional requirements are tracked in this Security Target.

The TOE components consist of all the TOE components listed in section “TOE components” of the Hardware Security Target [11] plus all TOE components listed in the table below:

**Table 1. Components of the TOE that are additional to the Hardware Security Target**

Type	Name	Release	Date	Form of Delivery
Library File	phSmx2CIAes.lib	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CDes.lib	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIRsa.lib	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIRsaKg.lib	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIEccGfp.lib	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CISha.lib	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CISha512.lib	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIRng.lib	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIUtils.lib	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
Header File	phSmx2CIAes.h	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CDes.h	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIRsa.h	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIRsaKg.h	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIEccGfp.h	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CISha.h	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CISha512.h	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIRng.h	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file

Type	Name	Release	Date	Form of Delivery
	phSmx2CIUtils.h	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIUtils_ImportExportFcts.h	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIUtils_RngAccess.h	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CITypes.h	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
Source Code	phSmx2CIUtils_ImportExportFcts.a51	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
	phSmx2CIUtils_RngAccess.a51	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic file
Documents	User Guidance Manual [15]	1.5	2016-01-14	Electronic document
	User Guidance: AES [17]	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic document
	User Guidance: DES [18]	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic document
	User Guidance: RSA [21]	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic document
	User Guidance: RSA Key Generation [22]	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic document
	User Guidance: ECC over GF(p) [23]	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic document
	User Guidance: SHA [19]	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic document
	User Guidance: SHA512 [20]	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic document
	User Guidance: RNG [16]	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic document
	User Guidance: Utils [24]	1.0	2012-12-05	Electronic document

### 1.3.1 Hardware Description

The NXP SmartMX2 hardware is described in section “Hardware Description” of the Hardware Security Target [11]. The IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software stored in the Test-ROM and delivered with the hardware platform is described in section “Software Description” of the Hardware Security Target [11].

### 1.3.2 Software Description

A Smartcard embedded Software developer may create Smartcard embedded Software to execute on the NXP SmartMX2 hardware. This software is stored in arbitrary memory of the NXP SmartMX2 hardware and is not part of the TOE, with one exception: the Smartcard embedded Software may contain the “Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF” (or parts thereof<sup>3</sup>) and this Crypto Library (or parts thereof) is part of the TOE.

#### AES

- The AES algorithm is intended to provide encryption and decryption functionality.
- The following modes of operation are supported for AES: ECB, CBC, CBC-MAC, CMAC.

#### DES/3DES

- The DES and Triple-DES (3DES) algorithm is intended to provide encryption and decryption functionality.
- The following modes of operation are supported for DES and Triple-DES: ECB, CBC, CBC-MAC, CMAC

3. These crypto functions are supplied as a library rather than as a monolithic program, and hence a user of the library may include only those functions that are actually required – it is not necessary to include all cryptographic functions of the library in every Smartcard Embedded Software. For example, it is possible to omit the RSA or the SHA-1 components. However, some dependencies exist; details are described in the User Guidance [15]

To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate security level must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards). In particular this means that Single-DES and 2-key Triple-DES shall not be used.

### RSA

- The RSA algorithm can be used for encryption and decryption as well as for signature generation, signature verification, message encoding and signature encoding.
- The RSA key generation can be used to generate RSA key pairs.
- The RSA public key computation can be used to compute the public key that belongs to a given private CRT key.

The TOE supports various key sizes for RSA up to a limit of 4096 bits. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

### ECDSA (ECC over GF(p))

- The ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) algorithm can be used for signature generation and signature verification
- The ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) key generation algorithm can be used to generate ECC over GF(p) key pairs for ECDSA.
- The ECDH (ECC Diffie-Hellman) key exchange algorithm can be used to establish cryptographic keys. It can be also used as secure point multiplication.
- Provide secure point addition for Elliptic Curves over GF(p)

The TOE supports various key sizes for ECC over GF(p) up to a limit of 578 bits. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

### SHA

- The SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 algorithms can be used for different purposes such as computing hash values in the course of digital signature creation or key derivation.

To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate security level must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards). In particular this means that SHA-1 shall not be used.

### Resistance of cryptographic algorithms against attacks

The cryptographic algorithms are resistant against attacks as described in JIL, Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices [38], which include Side Channel Attacks, Perturbation attacks, Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) and timing attacks, except for SHA, which is only resistant against Side Channel Attacks and timing attacks.

More details about conditions and restrictions for resistance against attacks are given in the user documentation of the Crypto Library.

### Random number generation

- The TOE provides access to random numbers generated by a software (pseudo) random number generator and functions to perform a test of the hardware (true) random number generator at initialisation.

### Other security functionality

- The TOE includes internal security measures for residual information protection.



- The TOE provides a secure copy routine.
- The TOE provides a secure compare routine

Note that the TOE does not restrict access to the functions provided by the hardware: these functions are still directly accessible to the Smartcard embedded Software.

### 1.3.3 Documentation

The documentation for the NXP SmartMX2 hardware is listed in section “Documentation” of the Hardware Security Target [11].

The Crypto Library has associated user manuals and one user guidance documentation (see [15]). The user manuals contain:

- the specification of the functions provided by the Crypto Library,
- details of the parameters and options required to call the Crypto Library by the Smartcard Embedded Software and

The user guidance document contains:

- guidelines on the secure usage of the Crypto Library, including the requirements on the environment (the Smartcard Embedded Software calling the Crypto Library is considered to be part of the environment).

### 1.3.4 Interface of the TOE

The interface to the NXP SmartMX2 hardware is described in section “Interface of the TOE” of the Hardware Security Target [11]. The use of this interface is not restricted by the use of the Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF.

The interface to the TOE additionally consists of software function calls, as detailed in the “User Manual” documents of the Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF. The developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software will link the required functionality of the Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF into the Smartcard Embedded Software as required for his Application.

### 1.3.5 Life Cycle and Delivery of the TOE

The life cycle and delivery for the NXP SmartMX2 hardware is described in section “TOE Intended Usage” of the Hardware Security Target [11]

The crypto library is encrypted and signed for delivery. The actual delivery of the signed, encrypted file may be by e-mail or on physical media such as compact disks.

The Crypto Library is delivered as part of Phase 1 (for a definition of the Phases refer to section ‘1.2.3 TOE life cycle’ of the Protection Profile [10]) to the Smartcard Embedded Software developer. The Crypto Library may be delivered by e-mail or by delivering physical media such as compact disks by mail or courier. To protect the Crypto Library during the delivery process, the Crypto Library is encrypted and digitally signed. The Smartcard Embedded Software developer then integrates the Crypto Library in the Smartcard Embedded Software.

### 1.3.6 TOE Intended Usage

Regarding to phase 7 (for a definition of the Phases refer to section ‘1.2.3 TOE life cycle’ of the Protection Profile [10]), the combination of the smartcard hardware and the Smartcard Embedded Software is used by the end-user. The method of use of the product in this phase depends on the application. The TOE is intended to be used in an

unsecured environment, that is, the TOE does not rely on the Phase 7 environment to counter any threat.

For details on the usage of the hardware platform refer to section “TOE Intended Usage” in the Hardware Security Target [11].

The Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF is intended to support the development of the Smartcard Embedded Software since the cryptographic functions provided by the Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF include countermeasures against the threats described in this Security Target. The used modules of the Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF are linked to the other parts of the Smartcard Embedded Software and they are implemented as part of the Smartcard Embedded Software in arbitrary memory of the hardware platform.

### 1.3.7 TOE User Environment

The user environment for the crypto library is the Smartcard Embedded Software, developed by customers of NXP, to run on the NXP P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF hardware.

### 1.3.8 General IT features of the TOE

The general features of the NXP P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF hardware are described in section “TOE overview” of the Hardware Security Target [11]. These are supplemented for the TOE by the functions listed in section 1.2.1 of this Security Target.

## 2. CC Conformance and Evaluation Assurance Level

The evaluation is based upon:

- **Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1:** *Introduction and general model*, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-001, [1]
- **Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2:** *Security functional components*, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-002, [2]
- **Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3:** *Security assurance components*, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-003, [3]

For the evaluation the following methodology will be used:

- **Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:** *Evaluation methodology*, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009, CCMB-2009-07-004, [4]

The chosen level of assurance is **EAL 5 + augmented**.

The augmentations chosen are:

- AVA\_VAN.5
- ALC\_DVS.2
- ASE\_TSS.2

This Security Target claims the following CC conformances:

- CC 3.1 Part 2 extended, Part 3 conformant, EAL 5 augmented
- Strict Conformance to the Protection Profile [10]

The assurance level for evaluation and the functionality of the TOE are chosen in order to allow the confirmation that the TOE is suitable for use within devices compliant with the German Digital Signature Law.

**Note 1.** The hardware platform is evaluated according to the assurance level EAL 5 augmented. The evaluation of the hardware platform is appropriate for the composite evaluation since both the EAL level and the augmentations claimed in this Security Target are identical to those claimed for the hardware platform (refer to the Hardware Security Target [11]).

## 2.1 Conformance Claim Rationale

According to chapter 2 this Security Target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile [10]. As shown in 1.3 the composed TOE consists of hardware (Secure Smart Card Controller IC) and software (Dedicated Test and Support Software). This is identical to the TOE as defined in [10] and therefore the TOE type is consistent.

## 3. Security Problem Definition

This Security Target claims strict conformance to the Security IC Platform protection profile [10]. The Assets, Assumptions, Threats and Organizational Security Policies of the Protection Profile are assumed here, together with extensions defined in chapter 3 “Security Problem Definition” of the Hardware Security Target [11]. In the following sub-sections, only extensions to the different sections are listed. The titles of the chapters that are not extended are cited here for completeness.

### 3.1 Description of Assets

Since this Security Target claims strict conformance to a PP [10], the assets defined in section 3.1 of the Protection Profile apply to this Security Target.

User Data and TSF data are mentioned as assets in [11]. Since the data computed by the crypto library contains keys, plain text and cipher text that are considered as User Data and e.g. blinding vectors that are considered as TSF data the assets are considered as complete for this Security Target.

### 3.2 Threats

Since this Security Target claims strict conformance to the PP [10], the threats defined in section 3.2 “Threats” of the Hardware Security Target [11], are valid for this Security Target.

**Table 2. Threats defined in the Protection Profile**

Name	Title	Defined in
T.Leak-Inherent	Inherent Information Leakage	PP [10]
T.Phys-Probing	Physical Probing	PP [10]
T.Malfunction	Malfunction due to Environmental Stress	PP [10]
T.Phys-Manipulation	Physical Manipulation	PP [10]
T.Leak-Forced	Forced Information Leakage	PP [10]
T.Abuse-Func	Abuse of Functionality	PP [10]

Name	Title	Defined in
T.RND	Deficiency of Random Numbers	PP [10]
T.Unauthorised-Access	Unauthorised Memory or Hardware Access	HW-ST [11]
T.Data-Modification	Unauthorized modification of keys and data maintained by the MIFARE Software	HW-ST [11]
T.Impersonate	Impersonating authorized users during the authentication process of the MIFARE Software	HW-ST [11]
T.Cloning	Cloning using keys and data maintained by the MIFARE Software	HW-ST [11]

**Note 2.** Within the Hardware Security Target [11], the threat T.RND has been used in a context where the hardware (true) random number generator is threatened. The TOE consists of both hardware (NXP SmartMX2 P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF) and software (Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF). The Crypto Library provides random numbers generated by a software (pseudo) random number generator. Therefore the threat T.RND explicitly includes both deficiencies of hardware random numbers as well as deficiency of software random numbers.

### 3.3 Organisational Security Policies

Since this Security Target claims strict conformance to the PP [10], the Policy P.Process-TOE “Protection during TOE Development and Production” of the Protection Profile is applied here also.

The hardware security target defines additional security policies. They are listed in the table below:

**Table 3. Additional security policies of the HW ST [11]**

Name	Title	Defined in
P.Add-Components	Additional Specific Security Components	HW-ST [11]
P.Emulation	MIFARE Software Emulation	HW-ST [11]
P.DF-Transaction	DESFire Transaction Mechanism	HW-ST [11]

The Crypto Library part of the TOE uses the DES co-processor hardware to provide DES security functionality, and the AES co-processor hardware to provide AES security functionality as listed below in P.Add-Func: Additional Specific Security Functionality.

In addition to the security functionality provided by the hardware and defined in the Security Target of the P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF the following additional security functionality is provided by the Crypto Library for use by the Smart Card Embedded Software:

#### P.Add-Func: Additional Specific Security Functionality

The TOE provides the following additional security functionality to the Smartcard Embedded Software:

- AES encryption and decryption
- DES and Triple-DES encryption and decryption,
- RSA encryption, decryption, signature generation, signature verification, message encoding and signature encoding.
- RSA public key computation
- RSA key generation,
- ECDSA (ECC over GF(p)) signature generation and verification,
- ECC over GF(p) key generation,
- ECDH (ECC Diffie-Hellman) key exchange,
- ECC over GF(p) point addition,
- ECC over GF(p) curve parameter verification,
- SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 Hash Algorithms,
- access to the RNG (implementation of a software RNG),
- secure copy routine,
- secure compare routine;

In addition, the TOE shall

- provide protection of residual information, and
- provide resistance against attacks as described in Note 4 and in section 7.2.

Regarding the Application Note 6 of the Protection Profile [10] there are no other additional policies defined in this Security Target.

### 3.4 Assumptions

Since this Security Target claims strict conformance to the PP [10], the assumptions defined in section 3.4 of the Protection Profile, described in section 3.4 “Assumptions” of the Hardware Security Target [11], and shown in Table 4, are valid for this Security Target.

**Table 4. Assumptions defined in the PP [10] and the Hardware Security Target [11]**

Name	Title	Defined in
A.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization	PP [10]
A.Plat-Appl	Usage of Hardware Platform	PP [10]
A.Resp-Appl	Treatment of User Data	PP [10]
A.Check-Init	Check of initialisation data by the Smartcard Embedded Software	HW-ST [11]
A.Key-Function	Usage of Key-dependent Functions	HW-ST [11]
A.Secure-Values	Usage of secure values	HW-ST [11]
A.Terminal-Support	Terminal support to ensure integrity and confidentiality	HW-ST [11]

## 4. Security Objectives

This chapter contains the following sections: “Security Objectives for the TOE”, “Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software Development Environment” and “Security Objectives for the Operational Environment”.

### 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

The following table lists the security objectives of the Protection Profile [10] and the Hardware Security Target [11].

**Table 5. Security Objectives defined in the Protection Profile and the Hardware Security Target**

Name	Title	Defined in
O.Leak-Inherent	Protection against Inherent Information Leakage	PP [10]
O.Phys-Probing	Protection against Physical Probing	PP [10]
O.Malfunction	Protection against Malfunctions	PP [10]
O.Phys-Manipulation	Protection against Physical Manipulation	PP [10]
O.Leak-Forced	Protection against Forced Information Leakage	PP [10]
O.Abuse-Func	Protection against Abuse of Functionality	PP [10]
O.Identification	TOE Identification	PP [10]
O.RND	Random Numbers	PP [10]
O.HW_DES3	Triple DES Functionality	HW-ST [11]
O.HW_AES	AES Functionality	HW-ST [11]
O.CUST_RECONFIG	Post Delivery Configuration	HW-ST [11]
O.EEPROM_INTEGRITY	Integrity support of data stored in EEPROM	HW-ST [11]
O.FM_FW	Firmware Mode Firewall	HW-ST [11]
O.MEM_ACCESS	Area based Memory Access Control	HW-ST [11]
O.SFR_ACCESS	Special Function Register Access Control	HW-ST [11]
O.ACCESS-CONTROL	Access Control	HW-ST [11]
O.AUTHENTICATION	Authentication	HW-ST [11]
O.ENCRYPTION	Confidential Communication	HW-ST [11]
O.MAC	Integrity-protected Communication	HW-ST [11]
O.TYPE-CONSISTENCY	Data type consistency	HW-ST [11]
O.DF-TRANSACTION	DESFire Transaction mechanism	HW-ST [11]

**Note 3.** Within the Hardware Security Target [11], the objective O.RND has been used in context with the hardware (true) random number generator (RNG). In addition to this, the TOE also provides a software (pseudo) RNG. Therefore the objective O.RND is extended to comprise also the quality of random numbers generated by the software (pseudo) RNG. See also Note 2 in section 3.2, which extends T.RND in a similar way.

The following additional security objectives are defined by this ST, and are provided by the software part of the TOE:

O.AES	The TOE includes functionality to provide encryption and decryption facilities of the AES algorithm, see Note 4.
O.DES	The TOE includes functionality to provide encryption and decryption facilities of the DES & Triple-DES algorithm, see Note 4
O.RSA	The TOE includes functionality to provide encryption, decryption, signature creation, signature verification, message encoding and signature encoding using the RSA algorithm, see Note 4.
O.RSA_PubExp	The TOE includes functionality to compute an RSA public key from an RSA private key, see Note 4.
O.RSA_KeyGen	The TOE includes functionality to generate RSA key pairs, see Note 4..
O.ECDSA	The TOE includes functionality to provide signature creation and signature verification using the ECC over GF(p) algorithm, see Note 4.
O.ECC_DHKE	The TOE includes functionality to provide Diffie-Hellman key exchange based on ECC over GF(p), see Note 4.
O.ECC_KeyGen	The TOE includes functionality to generate ECC over GF(p) key pairs, see Note 4.
O.ECC_Add	The TOE includes functionality to provide a point addition based on ECC over GF(p), see Note 4.
O.SHA	The TOE includes functionality to provide electronic hashing facilities using the SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 algorithms.
O.Copy	The TOE includes functionality to copy memory content, see Note 4.
O.Compare	The TOE includes functionality to compare memory content, see Note 4.
O.REUSE	The TOE includes measures to ensure that the memory resources being used by the TOE cannot be disclosed to subsequent users of the same memory resource.

**Note 4.** All introduced security objectives claiming cryptographic functionality and the security objectives for copy and compare are protected against attacks as described in the JIL, Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices [37], which include Side Channel Attacks, Perturbation attacks, Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) and timing attack. The following exceptions apply:

(a) RSA Public Key computation and RSA Key generation do not contain protective measures against DPA

(b) ECDSA(ECC over GF(p)) Key Generation does not contain protective measures against DPA

(c) SHA-1 SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 do not contain protective measures against DPA and DFA

This does not mean that the algorithm is insecure; rather at the time of this security target no promising attacks were found. More details about conditions and restrictions for resistance against attacks are given in the user documentation of the Crypto Library.

To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate security level must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards). In particular this means that SHA-1, Single-DES, 2-key Triple-DES, and short key lengths for RSA and ECC shall not be used.

#### 4.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software Development Environment

The security objectives for the security IC Embedded software Develop environment, listed in the following Table 6, are taken from the PP [10]. Additional refinements in the Hardware Security Target [11] are also valid in the ST for the Crypto Library (the “IC Dedicated Support Software”).

**Table 6. Security Objectives for the operational environment**

Name	Title	Applies to phase
OE.Plat-Appl	Usage of Hardware Platform	Phase 1
OE.Resp-Appl	Treatment of User Data	Phase 1

The crypto library TOE assumes that the Smartcard Embedded Software abides by the provisions detailed in “Clarification of “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)” and “Clarification of Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)” contained within section 4.2 “Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software Development Environment” of the Hardware Security Target [11] .

#### 4.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The security objective for the Security Objectives for the Operational environment”, listed in Table 7, Additional refinements in the Hardware Security Target [11] are also valid in the ST for the Crypto Library.

**Table 7. Security Objectives for the operational environment**

Name	Title	Applies to phase
OE.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization	Phase 4 through delivery to phase 7

The following additional security objectives for the Smart Card Embedded Software introduced in the Hardware Security Target [11] are also valid in the ST for the crypto library:



OE.Check-Init	Check of initialization data by the Smart Card Embedded Software.
OE.Check-OriginalityKey	Check of the Originality Key of the MIFARE Software
OE.Secure-Values	Generation of secure values
OE.Terminal-Support	Terminal support to ensure integrity and confidentiality

#### 4.4 Security Objectives Rationale

Section 7.1 of the Protection Profile provides a rationale how the assumptions, threats, and organisational security policies are addressed by the objectives that are subject of the PP [10]. The following table reproduces the table in section 4.4 of the PP [10].

**Table 8. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies**

Assumption, Threat or OSP	Security Objective	Note
A.Plat-Appl	OE.Plat-Appl	Phase 1
A.Resp-Appl	OE.Resp-Appl	Phase 1
P.Process-TOE	O.Identification	Phase 2 – 3, optional Phase 4
A.Process-Sec-IC	OE.Process-Sec-IC	Phase 5 – 6, optional Phase 4
T.Leak-Inherent	O.Leak-Inherent	
T.Phys-Probing	O.Phys-Probing	
T.Malfunction	O.Malfunction	
T.Phys-Manipulation	O.Phys-Manipulation	
T.Leak-Forced	O.Leak-Forced	
T.Abuse-Func	O.Abuse-Func	
T.RND	O.RND	

The following table provides the justification for the additional security objectives. They are in line with the security objectives of the Protection Profile and supplement these according to the additional assumptions and organisational security policy.

**Table 9. Additional Security Objectives versus Assumptions or Policies**

Assumption/Policy	Security Objective	Note
T.Unauthorised-Access	O.FM_FW O.MEM_ACCESS O.SFR_ACCESS	
P.Add-Components	O.HW_AES O.HW_DES3 O.CUST_RECONFIG O.EEPROM_INTEGRITY	
P.Add-Func	O.AES O.DES	

Assumption/Policy	Security Objective	Note
	O.RSA O.RSA_PubExp O.RSA_KeyGen O.ECDSA O.ECC_DHKE O.ECC_KeyGen O.ECC_Add O.SHA O.RND O.REUSE O.Copy O.Compare	
A.Key-Function	OE.Plat-Appl OE.Resp-Appl	Phase 1
A.Check-Init	OE.Check-Init OE.Check-OriginalityKey	Phase 1 and Phase 4 – 6

**T.Unauthorised-Access**

According to O.FM\_FW, O.MEM\_ACCESS and O.SFR\_ACCESS the TOE must enforce the partitioning of memory areas in Firmware Mode, System Mode and User Mode and enforce the segmentation of the memory areas in User Mode so that access of software to memory areas is controlled. Any restrictions have to be defined by the Security IC Embedded Software. Thereby security violations caused by accidental or deliberate access to restricted data (which may include code) can be prevented (refer to T.Unauthorised-Access). The threat T.Unauthorised-Access is therefore covered by the objective.

The clarification of “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)” makes clear that it is up to the Security IC Embedded Software to implement the memory management scheme by appropriately administrating the TSF. This is also expressed both in T.Unauthorised-Access and O.FM\_FW, O.MEM\_ACCESS and O.SFR\_ACCESS. The TOE shall provide access control functions to be used by the Security IC Embedded Software. This is further emphasised by the clarification of “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)” which reminds that the Security IC Embedded Software must not undermine the restrictions of the hardware platform. Therefore, the clarifications contribute to the coverage of the threat T.Unauthorised-Access.

**P.Add-Components**

Since the objectives O.HW\_DES3, O.HW\_AES, O.CUST\_RECONFIG and O.EEPROM\_INTEGRITY require the TOE to implement exactly the same specific security functionality as required by P.Add-Components, the organisational security policy is covered by the objectives.

Nevertheless the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced define how to implement the specific security functionality required by P.Add-Components. These security objectives are also valid for the additional specific security functionality since they must avert the related threats also for the components added related to the policy.

The requirements for a multi-application platform necessitate the separation of users. Therefore it is volitional that most of the security functionality cannot be influenced or used in User Mode.

### P.Add-Func

Since the objectives O.AES, O.DES, O.RSA, O.RSA\_PubExp, O.RSA\_KeyGen, O.ECDSA, O.ECC\_DHKE, O.ECC\_KeyGen, O.ECC\_Add, O.SHA, O.RND, O.Copy, O.Compare, and O.REUSE require the TOE to implement exactly the same specific security functionality as required by P.Add-Func, the organizational security policy P.Add-Func is covered by the security objectives. Additionally, the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced define how to implement the specific security functionality required by P.Add-Func and therefore support P.Add-Func. These security objectives are also valid for the additional specific security functionality since they must also avert the related threats for the components added to the organisational security policy.

### A.Key-Function

Compared to [10] a clarification has been made for the security objective “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)”: If required the Security IC Embedded Software shall use the cryptographic service of the TOE and its interface as specified. In addition, the Security IC Embedded Software (i) must implement operations on keys (if any) in such a manner that they do not disclose information about confidential data and (ii) must configure the memory management in a way that different applications are sufficiently separated. If the Security IC Embedded Software uses random numbers provided by the security service SS.RNG these random numbers must be tested as appropriate for the intended purpose. This addition ensures that the assumption A.Key-Function is still covered by the objective OE.Plat-Appl although additional functions are being supported according to P.Add-Components and P.Add-Func.

Compared to [10] a clarification has been made for the security objective “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)”: By definition cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are User Data. So, the Security IC Embedded Software will protect such data if required and use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation. Quality and confidentiality must be maintained for keys that are imported and/or derived from other keys. This implies that appropriate key management has to be implemented in the environment. In addition the treatment of User Data comprises the implementation of a multi-application operating system that does not disclose security relevant User Data of one application to another one. These measures make sure that the assumption A.Key-Function is still covered by the security objective OE.Resp-Appl although additional functions are being supported according to P.Add-Components and P.Add-Func.

### A.Check-Init

is split because the assumption is mapped to two security objectives for the environment. Both allow an appropriate identification of the TOE. The justification is as follows:

- Since OE.Check-Init requires the Security IC Embedded Software developer to implement a function assumed in A.Check-Init, the assumption is covered by the objective.
- OE.Check-OriginalityKey requires the user of the MIFARE Software to check the originality of the TOE as assumed in A.Check-Init. This check is based on data stored in the EEPROM and defined by NXP.

Both security objectives for the environment are suitable to check the TOE as assumed in A.Check-Init. Based on the two security objectives for the environment the administrator of the MIFARE Software and the user of the Security IC Embedded Software are independently able to identify the TOE.

Note: OE.Check-OriginalityKey is only available and required if MIFARE Software is enabled.

Additional MIFARE Software assumptions, threats and policies are given in the Hardware Security Target [11]. They are listed in the table below:

**Table 10. Additional Security Objectives versus Assumption, Threats or Policies (MIFARE Software)**

Assumption, Threat or OSP	Security Objective	Note
A.Secure-Values	OE.Secure-Values	Phase 7
A.Terminal-Support	OE.Terminal-Support	Phase 5- 6
T.Data-Modification	O.ACCESS-CONTROL O.TYPE-CONSISTENCY OE.Terminal-Support	
T.Impersonate	O.AUTHENTICATION OE.Secure-Values	
T.Cloning	O.ACCESS-CONTROL O.AUTHENTICATION OE.Secure-Values	
P.Emulation	O.ENCRYPTION O.MAC OE.Terminal-Support.	
P.DF-Transaction	O.DF-TRANSACTION	

Justification is given in the Hardware Security Target [11] section 4.4.

## 5. Extended components definition

To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FDP\_SOP) of the Class FDP (user data protection) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for basic operations on data in the TOE.

Note that the PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [10] also defines extended security functional requirements in chapter 5, which are included in this Security Target.

As defined in CC Part 2, FDP class addresses user data protection. Secure basic operations (FDP\_SOP) address protection of user data when it is processed by Copy or Compare function, respectively. Therefore, it is judged that FDP class is suitable for FDP\_SOP family.


The reason for adding an extra family to FDP class is that existing families do not address protection of user data against all relevant attacks. In particular, FDP\_IFC and FDP\_ITT (as well as FPT\_ITT) are associated with protection against side-channel attacks.

## 5.1 Secure basic operations (FDP\_SOP)

### Family Behaviour

This family defines requirements for the TOE to perform basic operations on data, which could be user data but also key data.

### Component levelling



FDP\_SOP.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to perform basic secure operations on data

### Management: FDP\_SOP.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

### Audit: FDP\_SOP.1

There are no actions defined to be auditable.

### FDP\_SOP.1 Secure basic operations

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**FDP\_SOP.1.1** The TSF shall provide a [selection: *Copy, Compare*] function on data [Selection: *from source* [assignment: *list of objects*] to *destination* [assignment: *list of objects*], residing in [assignment: *list of objects*].

Application note: The different memories, are seen as possible objects

## 6. Security Requirements

### 6.1 Security Functional Requirements

To support a better understanding of the combination Protection Profile and Security Target of the hardware platform (P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF) vs. this Security Target (Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF), the TOE SFRs are presented in the following two different sections.

#### 6.1.1 SFRs of the Protection Profile and the Security Target of the platform

The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) for this TOE (Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF) are specified based on the Smart Card IC Platform Protection Profile [10], and are defined in the Common Criteria or in the Protection Profile, as is shown by the third column of the following table:

**Table 11. SFRs defined in the Protection Profile or the Common Criteria**

Name	Title	Defined in
FAU_SAS.1	Audit storage	PP Section 5.3 [10] (provided by chip HW)
FCS_RNG.1	Generation of random numbers	PP Section 5.1 [10] (provided by chip HW).

Name	Title	Defined in
FDP_IFC.1	Subset information flow control	CC Part 2 [2] (provided by chip HW)
FDP_ITT.1	Basic internal transfer protection	CC Part 2 [2] (provided by chip HW)
FMT_LIM.1	Limited capabilities	PP Section 5.2 [10] (provided by chip HW)
FMT_LIM.2	Limited availability	PP Section 5.2 [10] (provided by chip HW)
FPT_FLS.1	Failure with preservation of secure state	CC Part 2 [2] (provided by chip HW)
FPT_ITT.1	Basic internal TSF data transfer protection	CC Part 2 [2] (provided by chip HW)
FPT_PHP.3	Resistance to physical attack	CC Part 2 [2] (provided by chip HW)
FRU_FLT.2	Limited fault tolerance	CC Part 2 [2] (provided by chip HW)

**Note 5.** These requirements have already been stated in the hardware ST [11] and are fulfilled by the chip hardware, if not indicated otherwise in Table 11.

The TOE shall meet the requirements “Random number generation” as specified below.

### **FCS\_RNG.1[DET] Random number generation**

The hardware part of the TOE (NXP SmartMX2) provides a physical random number generator (RNG) that fulfils FCS\_RNG.1 as already mentioned above in Table 11. The additional software part of the TOE (Crypto Library) implements a software (pseudo) RNG that fulfils FCS\_RNG.1[DET] (see below). This software RNG obtains its seed from the hardware RNG, after the TOE (Crypto Library) has performed a self test of the hardware RNG.

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_RNG.1.1[DET] The TSF shall provide a *deterministic* random number generator that implements:  
*(K.4.1) a chi-squared test on the seed generator.*  
*(DRG.3.1) If initialized with a random seed using a PTRNG of class PTG.2 (as defined in [7]) as random source, the internal state of the RNG shall have at least 256 bit of entropy.*  
*(DRG.3.2) The RNG provides forward secrecy (as defined in [7]).*  
*(DRG.3.3) The RNG provides backward secrecy even if the current internal state is known (as defined in [7]).*

FCS\_RNG.1.2[DET] The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet:  
*(K.4.2) class K.4 of AIS20 [5].*  
*(DRG.3.4) The RNG, initialized with a random seed using a PTRNG of class PTG.2 (as defined in [7]) as random source,*

*generates output for which in AES mode  $2^{48}$  and in 3DES mode  $2^{35}$  strings of bit length 128 are mutually different with probability at least  $1 - 2^{-24}$  in AES mode and  $1 - 2^{-17}$  in 3DES mode.*

*(DRG.3.5) Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random numbers must pass test procedure A (as defined in [7]).*

**Application Notes:**

(1) The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and similar techniques.

(2) The Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)yVF provides the smartcard embedded software with separate library calls to initialise the random number generator (which includes the chi-squared test) and to generate random data. The user can call an initialisation function upon use of the random number generator

**Dependencies:**

No dependencies.

**Note:**

Only if the chi-squared test succeeds the hardware RNG seeds the software RNG implemented as part of the Crypto Library on SmartMX2 (as part of security functionality SS.SW\_RNG).

**Note:**

The Crypto Library does not prevent the operating system from accessing the hardware RNG. If the hardware RNG is used by the operating system directly, it has to be decided based on the Smartcard Embedded Software's security needs, what kind of test has to be performed and what requirements will have to be applied for this test. In this case the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure that the conditions prescribed in the Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the NXP SmartMX2 Secure Smart Card Controller are met.

The SFRs from Table 11 are supplemented by additional SFRs, defined in the Common Criteria, as described in sections “Additional SFRs regarding cryptographic functionality”, “Additional SFRs regarding access control”, “Additional SFRs regarding for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0” and “Additional SFRs regarding for the MIFARE DESFire EV1” of the Hardware Security Target [11] and shown in the following table.

**Table 12. SFRs defined in the Hardware Security Target**

Name	Title	Defined in
FCS_COP.1[HW_AE S]	Cryptographic operation	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs regarding cryptographic functionality”.
FCS_COP.1[HW_DE S]	Cryptographic operation	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs regarding cryptographic functionality”.
FDP_SDI.2[HW]	Stored data integrity	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the

Name	Title	Defined in
	monitoring and action	Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs regarding cryptographic functionality”.
FDP_ACC.1[MEM]	Subset access control	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs regarding access control”.
FDP_ACC.1[SFR]	Subset access control	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs regarding access control”.
FDP_ACF.1[MEM]	Security attribute based access control	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs regarding access control”.
FDP_ACF.1[SFR]	Security attribute based access control	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs regarding access control”.
FMT_MSA.3[MEM]	Static attribute initialization	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs regarding access control”.
FMT_MSA.3[SFR]	Static attribute initialization	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs regarding access control”.
FMT_MSA.1[MEM]	Management of security attributes	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs regarding access control”.
FMT_MSA.1[SFR]	Management of security attributes	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs regarding access control”.
FMT_SMF.1[HW]	Specification of management functions	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs regarding access control”.
FDP_ACC.1[MFP]	Security attribute based access control	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0”.
FDP_ACF.1[MFP]	Security attribute based access control	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0”.
FMT_MSA.3[MFP]	Static attribute initialisation	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0”.
FMT_MSA.1[MFP]	Management of security attributes	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0”.
FMT_SMF.1[MFP]	Specification of Management Functions	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section “Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0”.



Name	Title	Defined in
FMT_SMR.1[MFP]	Security roles	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0".
FDP_ITC.2[MFP]	Import of user data with security attributes	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0".
FPT_TDC.1[MFP]	Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0".
FIA_UID.2[MFP]	User identification before any action	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0".
FIA_UAU.2[MFP]	User authentication before any action	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0".
FIA_UAU.5[MFP]	Multiple authentication mechanisms	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0".
FTP_TRP.1[MFP]	Trusted path	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0".
FCS_CKM.4[MFP]	Cryptographic key destruction	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0".
FPT_RPL.1[MFP]	Replay detection	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0".
FCS_COP.1[MFP_AE S]	Cryptographic operation S	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0".
FDP_ACC.1[DF]	Subset access control	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE D".
FDP_ACF.1[DF]	Security attribute based access control	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FMT_MSA.3[DF]	Static attribute initialization	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FMT_MSA.1[DF]	Management of security attributes	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FMT_SMF.1[DF]	Specification of Management Functions	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs

Name	Title	Defined in
		for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FMT_SMR.1[DF]	Security roles	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FDP_ITC.2[DF]	Import of user data with security attributes	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FPT_TDC.1[DF]	Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FIA_UID.2[DF]	User identification before any action	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FIA_UAU.2[DF]	User authentication before any action	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FIA_UAU.5[DF]	Multiple authentication mechanisms	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FTP_TRP.1[DF]	Trusted path	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FCS_CKM.4[DF]	Cryptographic key destruction	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FDP_ROL.1[DF]	Basic rollback	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FPT_RPL.1[DF]	Replay detection	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FCS_COP.1[DF_AES]	Cryptographic operation	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".
FCS_COP.1[DF_DES]	Cryptographic operation	CC Part 2 [2], and added to PP in the Hardware ST [11] section "Additional SFRs for the MIFARE DESFire EV1".

Like the requirements already listed in Table 11, the requirements listed in Table 12 have already been stated in the Hardware Security Target [11] and are fulfilled by the chip hardware and MIFARE software.

### 6.1.2 SFRs added by Crypto Library

The SFRs in Table 11 and Table 12 are further supplemented by the additional SFRs described in the following subsections of this Security Target, as listed in Table 13. The

SFRs described in Table 13 are new for the crypto library. The composite TOE, consisting of chip hardware, MIFARE software and crypto library software, fulfils all requirements from Table 11, Table 12 and Table 13.

**Table 13. SFRs defined in this Security Target**

Name	Title	Defined in
FCS_COP.1[SW-AES]	Cryptographic operation (AES)	CC Part 2 [2]; specified in this ST, see below.
FCS_COP.1[SW-DES]	Cryptographic operation (DES & TDES)	CC Part 2 [2]; specified in this ST, see below.
FCS_COP.1[RSA]	Cryptographic operation (RSA encryption, decryption, signature and verification)	CC Part 2 [2]; specified in this ST, see below.
FCS_COP.1[RSA_Pad]	Cryptographic operation (RSA message and signature encoding)	CC Part 2 [2]; specified in this ST, see below.
FCS_COP.1[RSA_PubExp]	Cryptographic operation (RSA public key computation)	CC Part 2 [2]; specified in this ST, see below.
FCS_COP.1[ECDSA]	ECDSA Cryptographic operation (ECC over GF(p) signature generation and verification)	CC Part 2 [2]; specified in this ST, see below.
FCS_COP.1[ECC_DHKE]	ECDH Cryptographic operation (ECC Diffie-Hellman key exchange)	CC Part 2 [2]; specified in this ST, see below.
FCS_COP.1[ECC_Additional]	ECC point addition and ECC domain parameter verification	CC Part 2 [2]; specified in this ST, see below.
FCS_COP.1[SHA]	Cryptographic operation (SHA-1 <sup>4</sup> , SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512)	CC Part 2 [2]; specified in this ST, see below.
FCS_CKM.1[RSA]	Cryptographic key generation (RSA key generation)	CC Part 2 [2]; specified in this ST, see below.
FCS_CKM.1[ECC]	ECC Cryptographic key generation (ECC over GF(p) key generation)	CC Part 2 [2]; specified in this ST, see below.
FCS_CKM.4	Cryptographic Key Destruction	CC Part 2 [2]; specified in this ST, see below.
FDP_RIP.1	Subset residual information protection	CC Part 2 [2]; specified in this ST, see below.

The requirements listed in Table 13 are detailed in the following sub-sections.

#### Additional SFR regarding cryptographic functionality

The TSF provides cryptographic functionality to help satisfy several high-level security objectives. In order for a cryptographic operation to function correctly, the operation must

- Due to the AVA\_VAN.5 requirement SHA-1 shall not be used.

be performed in accordance with a specified algorithm and with a cryptographic key of a specified size. The following Functional Requirements to the TOE can be derived from this CC component:

#### **FCS\_COP.1[SW-AES] Cryptographic operation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1[SW-AES] The TSF shall perform *encryption and decryption* in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm *AES* in one of the following modes of operation: *ECB, CBC, CBC-MAC or CMAC* and cryptographic key sizes *128, 192 and 256 bit* that meet the following: *FIPS Publication 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [34], NIST Special Publication 800-38A, 2001 (ECB and CBC mode) [35], ISO 9797-1, Algorithm 1 (CBC-MAC mode) [28], and NIST Special Publication 800-38B (CMAC mode) [36]*.

Application Notes: The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and other attacks described in [38].

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.

#### **FCS\_COP.1[SW-DES] Cryptographic operation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1[SW-DES] The TSF shall perform *encryption and decryption* in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm *DES and Triple-DES* in one of the following modes of operation: *ECB, CBC, CBC-MAC or CMAC* and cryptographic key sizes *1-key DES (56 bit), 2-key TDES (112 bit) or 3-key TDES (168 bit)* that meet the following: *FIPS Publication 46-3 (DES and TDES) [31] and NIST Special Publication 800-38A, 2001 (ECB and CBC mode) [35], ISO 9797-1, Algorithm 1 (CBC-MAC mode) [28], and NIST Special Publication 800-38B (CMAC mode) [36]*

Application Notes: The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and other attacks described in [38]. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate security level must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards). In particular this means that Single-DES and 2-key Triple-DES shall not be used.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.

#### **FCS\_COP.1[RSA] Cryptographic operation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1[RSA] The TSF shall perform *encryption, decryption, signature and verification* in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm *RSA* and cryptographic key sizes *512 bits to 4096 bits* that meet the following: *PKCS #1, v2.1: RSAEP, RSADP, RSASP1, RSAVP1*.

Application Notes: The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and other attacks described in [38]. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.

### FCS\_COP.1[RSA\_Pad] Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1[RSA\_Pad] The TSF shall perform *message and signature encoding methods* in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm *EME-OAEP and EMSA-PSS* and cryptographic key sizes *512 bits to 4096 bits* that meet the following: *PKCS #1, v2.1: EME-OAEP and EMSA-PSS*.

Application Notes: The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and other attacks described in [38]. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.

### FCS\_COP.1[RSA\_PubExp] Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1[RSA\_PubExp] The TSF shall perform *public key computation* in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm *RSA* and cryptographic key sizes *512 bits to 4096 bits* that meet the following: *PKCS #1, v2.1*.

Application Notes: The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and other attacks described in [38]. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

(2) The computation will result in the generation of a public RSA key from the private key (in CRT format). As this key is implied by the private key, this is not true key generation, and, to prevent duplication in this ST, this has not been included as a separate FCS\_CKM.1 SFR.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.

#### **FCS\_COP.1[ECDSA] Cryptographic operation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1[ECDSA] The TSF shall perform *signature generation and verification* in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm *ECDSA / ECC over GF(p)* and cryptographic key sizes *128 to 576 bits* that meet the following: *ISO/IEC 15946-2*.

Application Notes: The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and other attacks described in [38]. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.

#### **FCS\_COP.1[ECC\_DHKE]Cryptographic operation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1[ECC\_DHKE] The TSF shall perform *Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange* in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm *ECC over GF(p)* and cryptographic key sizes *128 to 576 bits* that meet the following: *ISO/IEC 15946-3*.

Application Notes: (1) The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and other attacks described in [38]. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

(2) The security functionality does not provide the complete key exchange procedure, but only the point multiplication which is used for the multiplication of the private key with the communication partner's public key. Therefore this function can be used as part of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange as well pure point multiplication.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction,.

#### **FCS\_COP.1[ECC\_Additional] Cryptographic operation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1[ECC\_Additional] The TSF shall perform *a full point addition* in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm *ECC over GF(p)* and cryptographic key sizes *128 to 576 bits* that meet the

following: *ISO/IEC 15946-1*. The TSF shall provide a basic ECC over  $GF(p)$  domain parameter check.

Application Notes:	(1) The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and other attacks described in [38]. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.

### FCS\_COP.1[SHA] Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1[SHA]	The TSF shall perform <i>cryptographic checksum generation</i> in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm <i>SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512</i> and cryptographic key size <i>none</i> that meet the following: <i>FIPS 180-3</i> .
Application Notes:	(1) The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and timing attacks as described in [38]. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate security level must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards). In particular this means that SHA-1 shall not be used.  (2) The length of the data to hash has to be a multiple of one byte. Arbitrary bit lengths are not supported.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.

The TSF provides functionality to generate a variety of key pairs. In order for the key generation to function correctly, the operation must be performed in accordance with a specified standard and with cryptographic key sizes out of a specified range. The following Security Functional Requirements to the TOE can be derived from this CC component:

### FCS\_CKM.1[RSA] Cryptographic Key Generation

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1[RSA]	The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <i>RSA</i> and specified cryptographic key sizes <i>512-4096 bits</i> that meet the following: <i>PKCS #1, v2.1 and "Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen: Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über</i>

*geeignete Algorithmen*), German “Bundesanzeiger Nr. 85“, p. 2034, June 7th, 2011”.

- Application Notes: The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and other attacks described in [38]. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).
- Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
- Note: The standard “Geeignete Algorithmen” sets up requirements for RSA key generation, if the generated RSA key pair is used in a signature application according to the German Signature Act. This standard is also accepted by the German Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) for Common Criteria evaluations that include the assurance requirements AVA\_VAN.5 with high attack potential.

### **FCS\_CKM.1[ECC] Cryptographic Key Generation**

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- FCS\_CKM.1.1[ECC] The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDSA (ECC over  $GF(p)$ ) and specified cryptographic key sizes 128-576 bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 15946-1 and “Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen: Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen), German “Bundesanzeiger Nr. 85“, p. 2034, June 7th, 2011”.
- Application Notes: The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and other attacks described in [38]. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).
- Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
- Note: The standard “Geeignete Algorithmen” sets up requirements for ECDSA key generation, if the generated ECDSA key pair is used in a signature application according to the German Signature Act. This standard is also accepted by the German Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) for Common Criteria evaluations that include the assurance requirements AVA\_VAN.5 with high attack potential.

### **FDP\_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection**

- Hierarchical to: No other components.



This family addresses the need to ensure that information in a resource is no longer accessible when the resource is deallocated, and that therefore newly created objects do not contain information that was accidentally left behind in the resources used to create the objects. The following Functional Requirement to the TOE can be derived from the CC component FDP\_RIP.1:

FDP\_RIP.1.1                    The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the *deallocation of the resource* from the following objects: *all objects (variables) used by the Crypto Library as specified in the user guidance documentation.*

Dependencies:                No dependencies.

**Note 6.** The TSF ensures that, upon exit from each function, with the exception of input parameters, return values or locations where it is explicitly documented that values remain at specific addresses, any memory resources used by that function that contained temporary or secret values are cleared.

#### FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

Hierarchical to:             No other components.

FCS\_CKM.4.1                The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method *overwrite* that meets the following: *ISO11568*

Application Notes:        The Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF provides the smartcard embedded software with library calls to perform various cryptographic algorithms that involve keys (e.g AES, DES, RSA, etc.). Through the parameters of the library calls the smartcard embedded software provides keys for the cryptographic algorithms. To perform its cryptographic algorithms the library copies these keys, or a transformation thereof, to the working-buffer (supplied by the smartcard embedded software) and/or the memory/special function registers of the P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF. Depending upon the algorithm the library either overwrites these keys before returning control to the smartcard embedded software or provides a library call to through which the smartcard embedded software can clear these keys. In the case of a separate library call to clear keys the guidance instructs the smartcard embedded software when/how this call should be used.

Dependencies:             [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation]

Note:                        Clearing of keys that are provided by the smartcard embedded software to the Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF is the responsibility of the smartcard embedded software.

### 6.1.3 Extended TOE security functional requirements

The SFRs in Table 11, Table 12, Table 13 are further supplemented by two iterations of an extended SFR introduced in the following subsections of this Security Target, as listed in Table 14.

**Table 14. SFRs defined in this Security Target**

Name	Title	Defined in
FDP_SOP.1[Copy]	Secure basic operations (secure copy)	specified in this ST, see below.
FDP_SOP.1[Compare]	Secure basic operations (secure compare)	specified in this ST, see below.

The FDP\_SOP.1 (secure basic operations) is introduced as a new component within a new family FDP\_SOP consisting only of that new component

#### FDP\_SOP.1[Copy]

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FDP\_SOP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a *Copy* function on data *from source ROM, RAM and EEPROM to destination RAM.*

Application Notes: The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and other attacks described in [38].

Note:

#### FDP\_SOP.1[Compare]

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FDP\_SOP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a *Compare* function on data *residing in ROM, RAM, EEPROM.*

Application Notes: The security functionality is resistant against side channel analysis and other attacks described in [38].

Note:

## 6.2 Security Assurance Requirements

Table 15 below lists all security assurance components that are valid for this Security Target. These security assurance components are required by EAL5 or by the Protection Profile [10]. Augmentations by the Security Target are marked with ST.

**Table 15. Security Assurance Requirements EAL5+ and PP augmentations**

SAR	Title	Required by
ADV_ARC.1	Security architecture description	PP / EAL5
ADV_FSP.5	Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information	EAL5
ADV_IMP.1	Implementation representation of the TSF	EAL5
ADV_INT.2	Well-structured internals	EAL5

SAR	Title	Required by
ADV_TDS.4	Semiformal modular design	EAL5
AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance	PP / EAL5
AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures	PP / EAL5
ALC_CMC.4	Production support, acceptance procedures and automation	PP / EAL5
ALC_CMS.5	Development tools CM coverage	EAL5
ALC_DEL.1	Delivery procedures	PP / EAL5
ALC_DVS.2	Sufficiency of security measures	PP / ST
ALC_LCD.1	Developer defined life-cycle model	PP / EAL5
ALC_TAT.2	Compliance with implementation standards	EAL5
ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims	PP / EAL5
ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition	PP / EAL5
ASE_INT.1	ST introduction	PP / EAL5
ASE_OBJ.2	Security objectives	PP / EAL5
ASE_REQ.2	Derived security requirements	PP / EAL5
ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition	PP / EAL5
ASE_TSS.2	TOE summary specification	PP / ST
ATE_COV.2	Analysis of coverage	EAL5
ATE_DPT.3	Testing: modular design	EAL5
ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing	EAL5
ATE_IND.2	Independent testing - sample	PP / EAL5
AVA_VAN.5	Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis	PP / ST

### 6.2.1 Refinements of the TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The ST claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile [10], and therefore it has to be conform to the refinements of the TOE security assurance requirements (see Application Note 22 of the PP).

The Hardware Security Target [11] has chosen the evaluation assurance level EAL5+. This Hardware Security Target bases on the Protection Profile [10], which requires the lower level EAL4+. This implies that the refinements made in the Protection Profile [10], section 6.2.1 Refinements of the TOE Assurance Requirements, for EAL4+ had to be

refined again in order to ensure EAL5+ in the Hardware Security Target (this was necessary for ACM\_CMS.5 and ADV\_FSP.5).

Since these refinements explain and interpret the CC for hardware, these refinements do not affect the additional software in this composite TOE. Therefore all refinements made in the PP [10] are valid without change for the composite TOE.

### 6.3 Security Requirements Rationale

#### 6.3.1 Rationale for the security functional requirements

Section 6.3.1 of the PP [10] provides a rationale for the mapping between security functional requirements and security objectives defined in the Protection Profile. The mapping is reproduced in the following table.

**Table 16. Mapping of Security Requirements to Security Objectives in the PP**

Objective	TOE Security Functional Requirements
O.Leak-Inherent	FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection” FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection” FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control”
O.Phys-Probing	FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
O.Malfunction	FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance” FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”
O.Phys-Manipulation	FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
O.Leak-Forced	All requirements listed for O.Leak-Inherent FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1 plus those listed for O.Malfunction and O.Phys-Manipulation FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
O.Abuse-Func	FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities” FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability” plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1
O.Identification	FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”
O.RND	FCS_RNG.1 “Quality metric for random numbers” for the hardware RNG plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1 plus: see [16] (for aspects concerning the software RNG)

**Note 7.** O.RND has been extended if compared to the PP [10] to include also a software RNG (see also Note 3). The rationale given in the PP only covers the part of O.RND dealing with the hardware RNG. For O.RND additional

functionality (software RNG) and additional requirements (FCS\_RNG.1[DET]) have been added. The explanation following Table 18 describe this in more detail.

The Hardware Security Target [11] lists a number of security objectives and SFRs that are additional to the Security Objectives and SFRs in the Protection Profile. These are listed in the following table.

**Table 17. Mapping of SFRs to Security Objectives in the Hardware ST**

Objectives	TOE Security Functional Requirements
O.HW_DES3	FCS_COP.1[DES]
O.HW_AES	FCS_COP.1[AES]
O.MF_FW	FDP_ACC.1[MEM] FDP_ACF.1[MEM] FMT_MSA.3[MEM]
O.MEM_ACCESS	FDP_ACC.1[MEM] FDP_ACF.1[MEM] FMT_MSA.3[MEM] FMT_MSA.1[MEM] FMT_MSA.1[SFR] FMT_SMF.1
O.SFR_ACCESS	FDP_ACC.1[SFR] FDP_ACF.1[SFR] FMT_MSA.3[SFR] FMT_MSA.1[SFR] FMT_SMF.1
O.CUST_RECONFIG	FMT_SMF.1[HW]
OE.Check-Init	Not applicable

The rationales for the mappings in Table 17 may be found in the Hardware ST [11] .

Finally, this ST lists a number of security objectives and SFRs additional to both the PP and the Hardware ST. These are listed in the following table.

**Table 18. Mapping of SFRs to Security Objectives in this ST**

Objectives	TOE Security Functional Requirements
O.AES	FCS_COP.1[SW-AES] ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs)
O.DES	FCS_COP.1[SW-DES] ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs)
O.RSA	FCS_COP.1[RSA] FCS_COP.1[RSA_Pad] ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs)
O.RSA_PubExp	FCS_COP.1[RSA_PubExp] ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs)

Objectives	TOE Security Functional Requirements
O.RSA_KeyGen	FCS_CKM.1[RSA] ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs)
O.ECDSA	FCS_COP.1[ECDSA] ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs)
O.ECC_DHKE	FCS_COP.1[ECC_DHKE] ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs)
O.ECC_Add	FCS_COP.1[ECC_Additional] ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs)
O.ECC_KeyGen	FCS_CKM.1[ECC] ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs)
O.SHA	FCS_COP.1[SHA] ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs)
O.Copy	FDP_SOP.1[Copy] ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs)
O.REUSE	FDP_RIP.1 FCS_CKM.4
O.Compare	FDP_SOP.1[Compare] ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs)
O.RND	FCS_RNG.1[DET] ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs)
OE.Plat-Appl	Not applicable
OE.Resp-Appl	Not applicable
OE-Process-Sec-IC	Not applicable

The justification of the security objectives **O.AES**, **O.DES**, **O.RSA**, **O.RSA\_PubExp**, **O.RSA\_KeyGen**, **O.ECDSA**, **O.ECC\_DHKE**, **O.ECC\_Add**, **O.ECC\_KeyGen**, **O.SHA**, **O.COPY** and **O.COMPARE** are all as follows:

- Each objective is directly implemented by a single SFR specifying the (cryptographic) service that the objective wishes to achieve (see the above table for the mapping).
- The requirements and architectural measures that originally were taken from the Protection Profile [10] and thus were also part of the Security Target of the hardware (chip) evaluation support the objective:
  - ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs) supports the objective by ensuring that the TOE works correctly (i.e., all of the TOE's capabilities are ensured) within the specified operating conditions and maintains a secure state when the TOE is outside the specified operating conditions. A secure state is also entered when perturbation or DFA attacks are detected.
  - ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs) ensures that no User Data (plain text data, keys) or TSF Data is disclosed when they are transmitted between different functional units of the TOE (i.e., the different memories, the CPU, cryptographic

co-processors), thereby supporting the objective in keeping confidential data secret.

- ADV.ARC.1 (and underlying platform SFRs) by ensuring that User Data and TSF Data are not accessible from the TOE except when the Smartcard Embedded Software decides to communicate them via an external interface.

The justification of the security objective **O.REUSE** is as follows:

- O.REUSE requires the TOE to provide procedural measures to prevent disclosure of memory contents that was used by the TOE. This applies to the Crypto Library V1.0 on P60D024/016/012MVB(Y/Z/A)/yVF and is met by the SFR FDP\_RIP.1 and FCS\_CKM.4, which requires the library to make unavailable all memory contents that has been used by it. Note that the requirement for residual information protection applies to all functionality of the Cryptographic Library.

The justification of the security objective **O.RND** is as follows:

- O.RND requires the TOE to generate random numbers with (a) ensured cryptographic quality (i.e. not predictable and with sufficient entropy) such that (b) information about the generated random numbers is not available to an attacker.  
(a) Ensured cryptographic quality (sufficient entropy part) of generated random numbers is met by FCS\_RNG.1.1[DET] through the characteristic 'deterministic' and the random number generator meeting ANSI X9.17 (FCS\_RNG.1.2[DET]). Ensured cryptographic quality (not predictable part) of generated random numbers is met by FCS\_RNG.1[DET] through the characteristic 'chi-squared test of the seed generator' and FCS\_RNG.1 from the certified hardware platform.  
(b) Information about the generated random numbers is not available to an attacker is met through ADV.ARC.1, which prevent physical manipulation and malfunction of the TOE and support this objective because they prevent attackers from manipulating or otherwise affecting the random number generator.

### 6.3.2 Extended requirements

This Security Target does not define extended requirements, because there are no existing SFRs available that cover the claimed functionality. The PP [10] contains extended functional requirements, that are explained in the rationale of the PP (see [10], section 5).

### 6.3.3 Dependencies of security requirements

The dependencies of all security requirements are met.

### 6.3.4 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements

The selection of assurance components and augmentations is generally based on EAL5, the underlying Protection Profile [10], and the Security Target of the hardware [11].

EAL5 was chosen to provide an even stronger baseline of assurance than the EAL4 in the Protection Profile. The augmentations AVA\_VAN.5, ALC\_DVS.2 and ASE\_TSS.2 were chosen to extend the level of assurance even further.

## 7. TOE Summary Specification

This chapter describes the "IT Security Functionality".

### 7.1 IT Security Functionality

The evaluation of this cryptographic library is performed as a composite evaluation, where the TOE comprises both the underlying hardware and the embedded software

(cryptographic library). The TOE of this composite evaluation therefore extends the security functionality already available in the chip platform (see section 7.1 “Portions of the TOE Security Functionality” of the Hardware Security Target [11]). The security functionality of the hardware platform is listed in the following table; the additional security functionality provided by the cryptographic library is described in the following sub-sections.

**Table 19. IT security functionalities defined in the Hardware Security Target [11]**

Name	Title
SS.RNG	Random Number Generator
SS.HW_AES	AES coprocessor
SS.HW_DES	Triple-DES coprocessor
SS.CRC	Cyclic Redundancy Check
SS.RECONFIG	Post Delivery Configuration
SS.MFP_AUTH	MIFARE Plus Authentication
SS.MFP_ACC_CTRL	Access Control to MIFARE Plus data
L	
SS.MFP_ENC	MIFARE Plus Encryption
SS.MFP_MAC	MIFARE Plus Message Authentication Code
SS.DF_AUTH	DESFire Authentication
SS.DF_ACC_CTRL	Access Control to DESFire Data
SS.DF_ENC	DESFire Communication Encryption
SS.DF_MAC	DESFire Message Authentication Code
SS.DF_TRANS	DESFire Transaction Protection
SF.OPC	Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY	Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG	Logical Protection
SF.COMP	Protection of Mode Control
SF.MEM_ACC	Memory Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC	Special Function Register Access Control
SF.FFW	Firmware Firewall
SF.FIRMWARE	Firmware Support

**Note 8.** The security functionality SS.RNG implements the hardware RNG. The TOE also implements software RNG as part of security functionality SF.SW\_RNG; for details see section 7.1.1.12. The hardware RNG is not externally visible through the interfaces of the Crypto Library; instead users of the Crypto Library are intended to use the software RNG (SF.SW\_RNG).



**Note 9.** The security functionality SF.LOG is extended by the crypto library TOE as described in section 7.2

**Note 10.** The following TSF are not used by the Crypto Library:

- SF.COMP (no special mode required)
- SF.MEM\_ACC (only access to own code and workspace needed, no further assumptions about memory access are made)
- SF.SFR\_ACC (only access to used SFRs needed, no further assumptions about SFR access are made)
- SF.FFW (no firmware used)
- SF.FIRMWARE (no firmware used)
- SS.RECONFIG (no reconfiguration possible when Crypto Library runs)
- SS.MFP\_AUTH, SS.MFP\_ACC\_CTRL, SS.MFP\_ENC and SS.MFP\_MAC (no use of Mifare Plus MF1PLUSx0)
- SS.DF\_AUTH, SS.DF\_ACC\_CTRL, SS.DF\_ENC, SS.DF\_MAC, SS.DF\_TRANS (no use of DESFire)

The IT security functionalities directly correspond to the TOE security functional requirements defined in section 6.1. The definitions of the IT security functionalities refer to the corresponding security functional requirements.

## 7.1.1 Security Services

### 7.1.1.1 SS.AES

The TOE uses the SmartMX2 AES hardware coprocessor to provide AES encryption and decryption facility using 128, 192 or 256 bit keys. The supported modes are ECB, “outer” CBC and CMAC (i.e. the CBC mode applied to the block cipher algorithm AES).

In addition, the TOE provides the ability to compute a CBC-MAC. The CBC-MAC mode of operation is rather similar to the CBC mode of operation, but returns only the last cipher text (see also [28] Algorithm 1)

SS.AES is a basic cryptographic function which provides the AES algorithm as defined by the standard [34].

The interface to SS.AES allows AES operations independent from prior key loading. The user has to take care that adequate keys of the correct size are loaded before the cryptographic operation is performed. Details are described in the user guidance [15] and the user manual [17]

Attack resistance for this security functionality is discussed in section 7.2.

This security functionality covers:

- FCS\_COP.1[SW-AES].

### 7.1.1.2 SS.DES

The TOE uses the SmartMX2 DES hardware coprocessor to provide a DES encryption and decryption facility using 56-bit keys, and to provide Triple-DES encryption and decryption. The Triple-DES function uses double-length or triple-length keys with sizes of 112 or 168 bits respectively. The supported modes are ECB, CBC and CMAC (i.e. the CBC mode applied to the block cipher algorithm 3DES or DES).

In addition, the TOE provides the ability to compute a CBC-MAC. The CBC-MAC mode of operation is rather similar to the CBC mode of operation, but returns only the last cipher text (see also [28], Algorithm 1, or [32], Appendix F). Like ECB and CBC, the CBC-MAC mode of operation can also be applied to both DES and 3DES as underlying block cipher algorithm.

To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate security level must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards). In particular this means that Single-DES and 2-key Triple-DES shall not be used.

SS.DES is a modular basic cryptographic function which provides the DES and Triple-DES algorithm (with two and three keys) as defined by the standard [31]

The interface to SS.DES allows performing Single-DES or 2-key and 3-key Triple-DES operations independent from prior key loading. The user has to take care that adequate keys of the correct size are loaded before the cryptographic operation is performed. Details are described in the user manual [18]. All modes of operation (ECB, CBC, CBC-MAC) can be applied to DES, two-key 3DES and three-key 3DES for a total of nine possible combinations.

Attack resistance for this security functionality is discussed in section 7.2.

This security functionality covers:

- FCS\_COP.1[SW-DES]

#### 7.1.1.3 SS.RSA

The TOE provides functions that implement the RSA algorithm for data encryption, decryption, signature and verification. All algorithms are defined in PKCS #1, v2.1 (RSAEP, RSADP, RSAP1, RSAVP1)

This routine supports various key lengths from 512 bits to 4096 bits. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

The TOE contains modular exponentiation functions, which, together with other functions in the TOE, perform the operations required for RSA encryption or decryption. Two different RSA algorithms are supported by the TOE, namely the "Simple Straight Forward Method" (called RSA "straight forward", the key consists of the pair  $n$  and  $d$ ) and RSA using the "Chinese Remainder Theorem" (RSA CRT, the key consists of the quintuple  $p$ ,  $q$ ,  $dp$ ,  $dq$ ,  $qInv$ ).

Attack resistance for this security functionality is discussed in section 7.2.

This security functionality covers:

- FCS\_COP.1[RSA]

#### 7.1.1.4 SS.RSA\_Pad

The TOE provides functions that implement the RSA algorithm and the RSA-CRT algorithm for message and signature encoding. This IT security functionality supports the EME-OAEP and EMSA-PSS signature scheme. All algorithms are defined in PKCS #1, v2.1 (EME-OAEP, EMSA-PSS)

This routine supports various key lengths from 512 bits to 4096 bits. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

Attack resistance for this security functionality is discussed in section 7.2.

This security functionality covers:

- FCS\_COP.1[RSA\_Pad]

#### 7.1.1.5 SS.RSA\_PublicExp

The TOE provides functions that implement computation of an RSA public key from a private CRT key. All algorithms are defined in PKCS #1, v2.1.

This routine supports various key lengths from *512 bits to 4096 bits (CRT)*. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

Attack resistance for this security functionality is discussed in section 7.2.

This security functionality covers:

- FCS\_COP.1[RSA\_PubExp]

#### 7.1.1.6 SS.ECDSA

The TOE provides functions to perform ECDSA Signature Generation and Signature Verification according to ISO/IEC 15946-2.

Note that hashing of the message must be done beforehand and is not provided by this security functionality, but could be provided by SS.SHA.

The supported key length is 128 bits to 576 bits. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

Attack resistance for this security functionality is discussed in section 7.2.

This security functionality covers:

- FCS\_COP.1[ECDSA]

#### 7.1.1.7 SS.ECC\_DHKE

The TOE provides functions to perform Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange according to ISO/IEC 15946-3.

The supported key length is 128 bits to 576 bits. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

Attack resistance for this security functionality is discussed in section 7.2.

This security functionality covers:

- FCS\_COP.1[ECC\_DHKE]

#### 7.1.1.8 SS.ECC\_Additional

The TOE provides functions to perform a full ECC point addition according to ISO/IEC 15946-1 as well as a basic curve parameter check for EC domain parameter.

The supported key length is 128 bits to 576 bits. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

Attack resistance for this security functionality is discussed in section 7.2.

This security functionality covers:

- FCS\_COP.1[ECC\_Additional]

#### 7.1.1.9 SS.RSA\_KeyGen

The TOE provides functions to generate RSA key pairs as described in PKCS #1, v2.1 and „Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen: Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen), German “Bundesanzeiger Nr. 85“, p. 2034, June 7th, 2011“.

It supports various key lengths from 512 bits to 4096 bits. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

Two different output formats for the key parameters are supported by the TOE, namely the "Simple Straight Forward Method" (RSA "straight forward") and RSA using the "Chinese Remainder Theorem" (RSA CRT).

Attack resistance for this security functionality is discussed in section 7.2.

This security functionality covers:

- FCS\_CKM.1[RSA]

#### 7.1.1.10 SS.ECC\_KeyGen

The TOE provides functions to perform ECC over GF(p) Key Generation according to ISO/IEC 15946-1 section 6.1 and “Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen: Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen), German “Bundesanzeiger Nr. 85“, p. 2034, June 7th, 2011”

It supports key length from 128 to 576 bits. To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate key length must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).

Attack resistance for this security functionality is discussed in section 7.2.

This security functionality covers:

- FCS\_CKM.1[ECC]

#### 7.1.1.11 SS.SHA

The TOE implements functions to compute the Secure Hash Algorithms SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 according to the standard FIPS 180-3 [33].

To fend off attackers with high attack potential an adequate security level must be used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards). In particular this means that SHA-1 shall not be used.

This security functionality covers:

- FCS\_COP.1[SHA]

#### 7.1.1.12 SS.SW\_RNG

The TOE contains both a hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) and a software RNG; for the hardware RNG (SS.SW\_RNG) see the Note 8. SS.SW\_RNG consists of the implementation of the software RNG and of appropriate online tests for the hardware RNG (as required for FCS\_RNG.1[DET] taken from the Protection Profile [10] and the proposal for AIS20/31 [7]):

The Crypto Library implements a software (pseudo) RNG that can be used as a general purpose random source. This software RNG has to be seeded by random numbers taken

from the hardware RNG implemented in the SmartMX2 processor. The implementation of the software RNG is based on the standard ANSI X9.17 as described in **Menezes, A; van Oorschot, P. and Vanstone, S.:** *Handbook of Applied Cryptography*, CRC Press, 1996, <http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/> [26].

In addition, the Crypto Library implements appropriate online tests according to the Hardware User Guidance Manual [12] for the hardware RNG, which fulfils the functionality class P2 defined by the AIS31 [6] and class PTG.2 defined by the proposal for AIS20/31 [7], as required by SFR FCS\_RNG.1[DET]. The interface of SS.SW\_RNG allows to test the hardware RNG and to seed the software RNG after successful testing.

This security functionality covers:

- FCS\_RNG.1[DET]

#### 7.1.1.13 SS.COPY

The security service SS.COPY implements functionality to copy memory content in a secure manner protected against attacks.

This resistance against attacks is described in section 7.2.

This security functionality covers:

- FDP\_SOP.1[COPY]

#### 7.1.1.14 SS.COMPARE

The security service SS.COMPARE implements functionality to compare different blocks of memory content in a manner protected against attacks.

This resistance against attacks is described in section 7.2.

This security functionality covers:

- FDP\_SOP.1[COMPARE]

### 7.1.2 Security Functions

#### 7.1.2.1 SF.Object\_Reuse

The TOE provides internal security measures which clear memory areas used by the Crypto Library after usage. This functionality is required by the security functional component FDP\_RIP.1 taken from the Common Criteria Part 2 [2].

These measures ensure that a subsequent process may not gain access to cryptographic assets stored temporarily in memory used by the TOE.

This security functionality covers:

- FDP\_RIP.1
- FCS\_CKM.4

## 7.2 Security architectural information

Since this Security Target claims the assurance requirement ASE\_TSS.2 security architectural information on a very high level is supposed to be included in the TSS to inform potential customers on how the TOE protects itself against interference, logical tampering and bypass. In the security architecture context, this covers the aspects selfprotection and non-bypassability.

### SF.COMP

The protection of mode control is completely covered by the underlying hardware platform [11].

#### SF.LOG

The logical protection relates to the SFRs FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1 and FDP\_IFC.1. The underlying hardware platform contains a number of hardware countermeasures, and for details is referred to the Security Target of the hardware platform [11].

For DES and AES; the resistance against SPA, DPA and timing attacks is provided by the co-processors in the hardware part of the TOE.

The TOE adds a number of countermeasures to protect RSA calculations and RSA key generation, modulus and exponent blinding is used. Furthermore, are timing attacks prevented using careful coding and timing resistance of the underlying co-processor.

For all ECC related calculations, randomized projective coordinates are used. Timing attacks are prevented using careful coding and timing resistance of the underlying co-processor.

For the key generation algorithms, there is no interface available to force the key generation to repeat the previous calculation with the same parameters.

For RSA also the number of times that the key generation and public key computation can be performed is limited.

For the secure compare and secure copy function measures randomizing the program flow are implemented.

#### SF.OPC

The control of operation conditions relates to the security requirements FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1. The underlying hardware platform contains a number of hardware countermeasures. For the details is referred to the Security Target of the hardware platform [11].

The TOE implements a number of software sensors that detect DFA attacks on AES, DES, RSA and ECC. Also software sensors are implemented to detect perturbation attacks in the secure copy and the secure compare functions.

#### SF.PHY

Protection against physical manipulation and probing is completely covered by the underlying hardware platform [11].

## 8. Annexes

### 8.1 Further Information contained in the PP

The Annex of the Protection Profile ([10], chapter 7) provides further information. Section 7.1 of the PP describes the development and production process of smartcards, containing a detailed life-cycle description and a description of the assets of the Integrated Circuits Designer/Manufacturer. Section 7.2 of the PP is concerned with security aspects of the Smartcard Embedded Software (further information regarding A.Resp-Appl and examples of specific Functional Requirements for the Smartcard Embedded Software). Section 8.3 of the PP gives examples of Attack Scenarios.

## 8.2 Glossary and Vocabulary

Note: To ease understanding of the used terms the glossary of the Protection Profile [10] is included here.

Application Data	All data managed by the Security IC Embedded Software in the application context. Application data comprise all data in the final Security IC.
Boot Mode	CPU mode of the TOE dedicated to the start-up of the TOE after every reset. This mode is not accessible for the Smartcard Embedded Software.
Composite Product Integrator	Role installing or finalising the IC Embedded Software and the applications on platform transforming the TOE into the unpersonalised Composite Product after TOE delivery. The TOE Manufacturer may implement IC Embedded Software delivered by the Security IC Embedded Software Developer before TOE delivery (e.g. if the IC Embedded Software is implemented in ROM or is stored in the non-volatile memory as service provided by the IC Manufacturer or IC Packaging Manufacturer).
Composite Product Manufacturer	The Composite Product Manufacturer has the following roles (i) the Security IC Embedded Software Developer (Phase 1), (ii) the Composite Product Integrator (Phase 5) and (iii) the Personaliser (Phase 6). If the TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) he has the role of the IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.  The customer of the TOE Manufacturer who receives the TOE during TOE Delivery. The Composite Product Manufacturer includes the Security IC Embedded Software developer and all roles after TOE Delivery up to Phase 6 (refer to Figure 2 on page 10 and Section 7.1.1).
CPU mode	Mode in which the CPU operates. The TOE supports five modes, the Boot Mode, Test Mode, Firmware Mode, System Mode and User Mode.  The Smartcard Embedded Software can only run in System Mode or User Mode. The other three modes (Boot, Test, and Firmware) are not accessible for the Smartcard Embedded Software.
DESFire	DESFire EV1 emulation, names the DESFire Operating System as part of the IC Dedicated Software.
End-consumer	User of the Composite Product in Phase 7.
Exceptions interrupts	Non-maskable interrupt of program execution starting from fixed (depending on exception source) addressees and enabling the System Mode. The source of exceptions are: hardware breakpoints, single fault injection detection, illegal instructions, stack overflow, unauthorised system calls, User Mode execution of RETI instruction and .

FabKey Area	A memory area in the EEPROM that contains data that is programmed during testing by the IC Manufacturer. The amount of data and the type of information can be selected by the customer.
Firmware Mode	CPU mode of the TOE dedicated to execution of the Emulation Framework, MIFARE DESFire and MIFARE Plus Operating System, which is part of the Security IC Dedicated Support Software. This mode is not accessible for the Security IC Embedded Software.
IC Dedicated Software	IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC (also known as IC firmware) and developed by the IC Developer. Such software is required for testing purpose (IC Dedicated Test Software) but may provide additional services to facilitate usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional services (IC Dedicated Support Software).
IC Dedicated Test Software	That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
IC Dedicated Support Software	That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
Initialisation Data	Initialisation Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to identify the TOE and to keep track of the Security IC's production and further life-cycle phases are considered as belonging to the TSF data. These data are for instance used for traceability and for TOE identification (identification data).
Integrated Circuit (IC)	Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.
Memory	The memory comprises of the RAM, ROM and the EEPROM of the TOE.
Memory Management Unit	The MMU maps the virtual addresses used by the CPU into the physical addresses of the RAM, ROM and EEPROM. The mapping is determined by (a) the memory partition and (b) the memory segments in User Mode. Up to 64 memory segments are supported for the User Mode, whereas the memory partition is fixed. Each segment can be individually (i) positioned and sized (ii) enabled or disabled, (iii) controlled by access permissions for read, write and execute and (iv) assigns access rights for "Special Function Registers related to hardware components" for code executed in User Mode from this segment.
Memory Segment	Address spaces provided by the Memory Management Unit based on its configuration (the MMU segment table). The memory segments define which memory areas are accessible for code running in User Mode. They are located in RAM, ROM and EEPROM.



MIFARE	Contact-less smart card interface standard, complying with ISO14443A.
MIFARE Plus	MIFARE Plus emulation, names the MIFARE Plus Operating System (MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0) as part of the IC Dedicated Software.
MIFARE Software	Term is used whenever MIFARE Plus MF1PLUSx0 or MIFARE DESFire EV1 is meant.
MMU segment table	This structure defines the segments that the Memory Management Unit will use for code running in User Mode. The structure can be located anywhere in the available memory for System Mode code. It also contains access rights for “Special Function Registers related to hardware components” for User Mode code.
Pre-personalisation Data	Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is injected into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 3). These data are for instance used for traceability and/or to secure shipment between phases.
Security IC	(as used in this Protection Profile) Composition of the TOE, the Security IC Embedded Software, User Data and the package (the Security IC carrier).
Security IC Embedded Software	Software embedded in a Security IC and normally not being developed by the IC Designer. The Security IC Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the Security IC in Phase 3 or in later phases of the Security IC product life-cycle. Some part of that software may actually implement a Security IC application others may provide standard services. Nevertheless, this distinction doesn't matter here so that the Security IC Embedded Software can be considered as being application dependent whereas the IC Dedicated Software is definitely not.
Security IC Product	Composite product which includes the Security Integrated Circuit (i.e. the TOE) and the Embedded Software and is evaluated as composite target of evaluation in the sense of the Supporting Document
Special Function Registers	Registers used to access and configure the functions for the communication with an external interface device, the cryptographic co-processor for Triple-DES, the FameXE co-processor for basic arithmetic functions to perform asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, the random numbers generator and chip configuration.
Security Row	Top-most 128 bytes of the EEPROM memory reserved for configuration purposes as well as dedicated memory area for the Smartcard Embedded Software to store life-cycle information about the TOE.
Super System Mode	This mode represents either the Boot Mode, Test Mode or Firmware Mode.

System Mode	The System Mode has unlimited access to the hardware resources (with respect to the memory partition). The Memory Management Unit can be configured in this mode.
Test Features	All features and functions (implemented by the IC Dedicated Test Software and/or hardware) which are designed to be used before TOE Delivery only and delivered as part of the TOE.
Test Mode	CPU mode for configuration of the TOE executing the IC Dedicated Test Software. The Test Mode is permanently and irreversible disabled after production testing. In the Test Mode specific Special Function Registers are accessible for test purposes.
TOE Delivery	The period when the TOE is delivered which is (refer to Figure 2 on page 10) either (i) after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) or (ii) after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged products.
TOE Manufacturer	<p>The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that all requirements for the TOE (as defined in Section 1.2.2) and its development and production environment are fulfilled (refer to Figure 2 on page 10).</p> <p>The TOE Manufacturer has the following roles: (i) IC Developer (Phase 2) and (ii) IC Manufacturer (Phase 3). If the TOE is delivered after Phase 4 in form of packaged products, he has the role of the (iii) IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.</p>
TSF data	Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE. This includes information about the TOE's configuration, if any is coded in non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM), in specific circuitry, in non-volatile programmable memories (for instance E2PROM) or a combination thereof.
User Mode	The User Mode has access to the memories under control of the Memory Management Unit. The access to the Special Function Registers is limited.
User Data	All data managed by the Smartcard Embedded Software in the application context. User data comprise all data in the final Smartcard IC except the TSF data.

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## 10. Legal information

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